Oh, yes! I was waiting for this!

Ulrich, thanks for the review of McIntosh's book. I was hoping someone would get around to critiquing it. Sri Aurobindo was barely acknowledged, and as you pointed out, where he was mentioned it was with utter disregard for what he actually proclaimed and expounded.

I personally find this whole Wilber-inspired "integral" crowd to be hopelessly shallow and frankly boring, though I do still like some of Wilber's earlier works. But someone does need to critique their work since they are so good at hijacking "integral", and I'm glad you wrote your review. I hope McIntosh reads it!

Ned, one of the perks of managing a journal is that you can ask authors or publishers for free review copies — and usually get them. I got my copy of Integral Consciousness directly from Steve and he is looking forward to my review, to the publication of which I have just alerted him. Let's see how he takes it.

Ned:
I personally find this whole Wilber-inspired "integral" crowd to be hopelessly shallow and frankly boring,


Ned, I will submit to you that one of the many problems with the "integral crowd" are the quasi-mystical notions they ascribed to evolution. And especially what is referred to as the evolution of consciousness and culture, that if one looks carefully can be traced back to social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer, the discredited pseudo-science of ontogenic recapitulation of phylogeny and even at times to the ideology of intelligent design (which I will address soon in a longer essay on Sri Aurobindo and evolution) - That said this does not necessarily mean that one must ascribe to the Dawinian Fundamentalist perspective of folks like Dawkins or Dennett, but there are certainly more promising narratives out there than these.


Now here is a question that should be posed?

What separates the evolution of consciousness/culture
from what otherwise is called historical processes?

Koantum,

I just finished reading your review of McIntosh’s book in AntiMatters. I have to admit I haven’t read the book itself, but I very much enjoyed and admired your review. One very minor comment; you write:

< In the tenth chapter McIntosh acknowledges that the line between science and philosophy has been blurred, and that, in particular “science by itself cannot prove that evolution has no meaning or that it is simply random and without purpose.” Materialists “are certainly entitled to argue for a philosophy which claims that the universe is a random accident. But they are not entitled to claim that this pessimistic philosophy of the universe is the only one supported by science.” It would seem to me that if more than one philosophy is “supported” by science, then it is actually beyond science to support any philosophy. >

Perhaps by “support” you had in mind something like “verify”, but I would have thought what McIntosh really meant in this context was something more like “does not contradict”. I.e. if neither of two incompatible philosophies is contradicted by any well-supported scientific theories, then one might claim that as a positive attribute of both those theories, whereas if a third insisted that biological evolution is impossible (Hegelianism?), one might say it is not supported by science, and perhaps that is a negative attribute of that philosophy. Or maybe you wouldn’t agree with that?

BTW I couldn’t find any mechanism on Anti-Matters.org to post letters or comments in response to articles, hence this post on SCIY.

Kepler

It would seem to me that if more than one philosophy is “supported” by science, then it is actually beyond science to support any philosophy.

I remember distinctly having made precisely this point, but right now I can't remember where.

if neither of two incompatible philosophies is contradicted by any well-supported scientific theories

Are there any well-supported non-trivial scientific theories?

I've been thinking of adding a comments blog to AntiMatters but so far shied away from the extra time this would involve.

Koantum: “I remember distinctly having made precisely this point, but right now I can't remember where”

Kepler: Sorry, my comment was unclear. In that sentence I was quoting you, from your review of McIntosh’s book. He had made what seemed an uncontroversial observation that materialism was not the only philosophy “supported by” (I think he meant “compatible with”) science. So I couldn’t see how your response: “It would seem to me that if more than one philosophy is “supported” by science, then it is actually beyond science to support any philosophy”, followed from that. I assumed you meant if science implies more than one incompatible philosophy, then science must not really be implying anything. Is that correct? If so, then I was pointing out that I thought he was actually just making the simpler point that not only materialism can be compatible with science.

Koantum: “Are there any well-supported non-trivial scientific theories?”

Kepler: Gravitation, thermodynamics, chemical bonding, plate tectonics, DNA replication? Maybe you meant non-trivial in having any direct philosophical implications?

Koantum: I've been thinking of adding a comments blog to AntiMatters but so far shied away from the extra time this would involve.

Kepler: I understand. People like me would likely hound you with obscure objections :) I liked your review a lot; I just had a doubt about this one particular portion of the text.

an uncontroversial observation that materialism was not the only philosophy “supported by” (I think he meant “compatible with”) science.

If he meant the latter, why did he say the former?

I assumed you meant if science implies more than one incompatible philosophy, then science must not really be implying anything.

Science doesn't imply any philosophy.

If so, then I was pointing out that I thought he was actually just making the simpler point that not only materialism can be compatible with science.

I thought that goes without saying.

Gravitation, thermodynamics, chemical bonding, plate tectonics, DNA replication?

We would have to consider these one by one. Gravitation, whether Newton or Einstein, is a computational tool, which makes it possible to calculate the acceleration that something in a given place at a given time undergoes if such and such is the distribution and motion of other things. A computational tool is not a theory in my book. Thermodynamics is probability theory applied to physical ensembles. Probability theory does not tell us what probability is, essentially it only helps insurance companies to minimize their risks. Chemical bonding? A model justified by quantum theory. Quantum theory? A computational tool encapsulating the observed correlations between measurement outcomes....

Koantum: [supported by (I think he meant compatible with) science], “If he meant the latter, why did he say the former?”

Kepler: Well, if philosophy A contradicts science, and philosophy B does not, one might say in common parlance that philosophy A is “not supported” by science, but B is. I assumed you were reading "support" in some stronger sense than this.

Koantum: Science doesn't imply any philosophy.

Kepler: So then I can’t understand what you meant by “It would seem to me that if more than one philosophy is “supported” by science, then it is actually beyond science to support any philosophy.“ How were you defining “support”, and why is it contingent on supporting not more than one philosophy? This is really my entire question.

Koantum: [not only materialism can be compatible with science], “I thought that goes without saying.”

Kepler: But maybe materialists would disagree? I assume that’s why McIntosh would bother to say it.

Re scientific theories, it seems you have a specific definition of “theory” in mind that you’re contrasting with “computational tools” and “models”. But for the discussion above we can stipulate that science is a set of tools and models instead of theories, if that helps.

How could philosophy contradict science? Got an example?

The relevant sense of supporting X is furnishing corroborating evidence for X. If science could furnish corroborating evidence for two (mutually contradictory) philosophies, then it wouldn't have anything philosophically relevant to say. Is this better? It's essentially the logical truism that "If X implies Y and X implies not-Y then X is absurd."I tried not to be that obvious.

But maybe materialists would disagree?

The book didn't strike me as being written for materialists.

it seems you have a specific definition of “theory” in mind that you’re contrasting with “computational tools” and “models”.

Nes and Yo. On the one hand, there is no "theory as such", about which one can make universal statements, just as there is no "game as such" (h/t Wittgenstein). On the other, I would expect of a theory to give me some insight into how things work, rather than merely magical formulas for manipulating things. Such disconnect between power and understanding may be at the root of much evil.

If we were to agree that science is a set of tools and models, then what is the issue? (I kinda lost track of it.)

Koantum: How could philosophy contradict science? Got an example?

Kepler: I thought I spotted one in your review. Herr Hegel sagte: “Thinking consideration must deny itself such nebulous, at bottom sensuous, conceptions, as is in especial the so-called origin . . . of the more highly developed animal organizations from the lower.”

Koantum: “If science could furnish corroborating evidence for two (mutually contradictory) philosophies, then it wouldn't have anything philosophically relevant to say. It's essentially the logical truism that "If X implies Y and X implies not-Y then X is absurd."I tried not to be that obvious.””

Kepler: So, you do seem to be identifying corroboration with implication. Then my only remaining issue is that I'd think corroboration can have a weaker logical meaning than implication, and multiple incompatible philosophies might both be supported by science in that weaker sense, specifically when one philosophy is materialism and one isn't. Yet if science contradicts a certain philosophy, that may remain a good reason to question that philosophy, i.e. at least in that sense science might retain something philosophically relevant to say.

Well, yeah, if you call Herr Hegel's opinions "philosophy" and if you call the origin of the more highly developed animal organizations from the lower "science".... (I would call the latter an empirical fact the process of which science knows next to nothing about.)

Corroboration is not the same as implication. If A implies B then by knowing A you also know B (assuming that you are sufficiently clever). If A corroborates B, you won't know B by simply knowing A. You need B as a hypothesis before A can corroborate B.

I'm not in favor of using words in unconventional ways, e.g., "supported" when what is meant is not "supported full stop" but "supported in some weaker sense."

Yet if science contradicts a certain philosophy...

It isn't up to science to contradict any philosophy. It's philosophies that have the privilege of contradicting each other. If science appears to contradict a philosophy, it is because a different philosophy has previously been smuggled into it. Science per se has nothing philosophically relevant to say.

Isn’t it pretty conventional to consider “support” (as also “evidence”) to have an associated degree or strength? Unlike logical implication which either is or is not the case. It’s sort of the induction versus deduction thing.

How about this:

1) It’s possible (perhaps even desirable) for a philosophy to be supported by empirical facts, “fit” empirical facts, or at least not contradict empirical facts.

2) Philosophies other than materialism can have the qualities listed in 1).

This is what I read McIntosh to be saying in the quote you gave. You responded to him (in effect) saying A can’t imply both B and not B. This stood out to me as the one unconvincing point in your otherwise very convincing review. So I just submit it as a humble point of feedback from your admiring readership.

Kepler