One could imagine that Husserl's phenomenolgical descriptions certainly could map well onto sankhya yogic analysis, and that both would make together an interesting language (inner technology) for exploring the formation of the tertiary retention circuit that constitutes trans-individual self-awareness. In negotiating a description of evolving subjectivity employing a hybridity of the two languages the tertiary retention circuit seems to me to be a sort of ahankara of the transindividual in which the formation of networked man or transindividual = a third order cybernetic circuit looping through the psycho-socio dimensions of being and its billion electronic nodes, with affective responses and attention spans adapted to the dromology of an instantaneous planetary culture interacting at light speeds driven by the libidinal flows of streamed capitalism. (noosphere?) But for that matter -reversing the inquiry as Koantum suggest- what does clearing the the lower parts of the antahkarna mean in ones sadhana when one is constantly bombarded by the consumptive images of the desiring machine? Anyway here is the Husserlian analysis in Steigler's rap: BS:We must speak of tertiary retentions if we are to complete the analysis in which Husserl distinguishes between primary and secondary retentions. Primary retention is, for example, what happens when you listen to me speaking and, applying the verb I use to the subject preceding it, a subject you no longer perceive, you maintain this subject in the verb, which constitutes the maintenance/presence of my discourse which is also what maintains your attention: you conjugate the subject to the verb, with a view to projecting this action designated by the verb toward its complement, projection which is a protention, that is, an expectation. What Husserl calls primary retention is this operation consisting of retaining a word in another (operation that Husserl analyses by studying the way in a melody a note maintains in itself the preceding one, and projects forward the expectation of another note – Leonard Meyer describes this as an expectation: it is the operation consisting in retaining a word which however is no longer present, the beginning of the sentence having been pronounced and in this respect already past, and yet still present in the sense that is thus elaborated as discourse. We must distinguish the operation we are calling primary retention from secondary retention. The latter is a memory: something that belongs to a past having passed by (it is thus a former primary retention), whereas the primary retention still belongs to the present, to a passing present: it is the passage itself, per se, and in this respect the direction of the present – its sense in the sense of direction as well. Now, the secondary memory is also what permits us to select possibilities from the stock of primary retentions: primary retention is a primary selection whose criteria are furnished by the secondary retentions. You are listening to me, but each one of you hears something different in what I say, and this is owing to the fact that your secondary retentions are singular ones: your pasts are singular ones. In the same stroke, your apprehension of what I say is each time singular: the meaning that you assign to my discourse, whereby you individualise yourself with my discourse, is each time singular – and this is the case because you select each time singularly primary retentions in the discourse I am giving for you, and through which I am trying to retain and to maintain your attention. However, if you could, now, repeat the whole discourse that you have just heard, for example because you had recorded it on a USB key in a MP3 format, you could effect, obviously new primary retentions, depending on previous primary retentions, become in the meantime secondary retentions. You would thus call into question the meaning of this discourse already constituted by yourself: your would produce a difference in meaning on the basis of this repetition, through which this meaning would moreover reveal itself as a process much more than a state, et more precisely, the process of your own individuation hooking up with the individuation that this discourse exemplifies, which is, in this case, my own individuation. You would thus form retentional circuits – which I do not have the time to explain why they are at the heart of what must be conceptualised as circuits of transindividuation. Be that as it may, that which allows such a discourse to be repeated, for example in the form of a recording in the MP3 format, is a tertiary retention with the same status as the text I am now reading for you, which allows me to repeat a discourse that I conceived elsewhere, and at another previous time: this is what Plato called a hypomnesic pharmakoni. Such a pharmakon allows the production of attentional effects, that is, retentional and protentional hook-ups, whose existence entirely justifies the definition of this pharmakon as a psychotechnical device. Such a device allows, to be more precise, the control of rentional and protentional hook-ups in view of producing attentional effects.